## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID GRENKE, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.

No. 12-14221

HEARST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a Delaware Corporation,

Defendant.

MOTION HEARING

Monday, December 8, 2014

- - -

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: ARI J. SCHARG, ESQ.

For the Defendant: JONATHAN R. DONNELLAN, ESQ.

To Obtain Certified Transcript, Contact:
Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, Official Court Reporter
Theodore Levin United States Courthouse
231 West Lafayette Boulevard, Room 238
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 962-1234

Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

Motion hearing		2
<u></u>		
<u></u>	INDEX	
		Pag
	ing	4

1		E	x	н	В	I	T	S	
2	Identification							Offered	Received
3									
4		N		0		N		E	
5									
6									
7									
8									
9									
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									
18									
19									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24									
25									

1	Detroit, Michigan
2	Monday, December 8, 2014
3	
4	
5	THE CLERK: Case Number 12-14221, David
6	Grenke versus Hearst Communications.
7	THE COURT: Good morning.
8	MR. DONNELLAN: Good morning.
9	MR. SCHARG: Good morning.
10	THE COURT: Would you like to state your
11	appearances?
12	MR. SCHARG: Ari Scharg on behalf of the
13	plaintiff.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	MR. SUMMERFIELD: Brian Summerfield on behalf
16	of the plaintiff.
17	THE COURT: Okay. Welcome.
18	MR. DONNELLAN: Jonathan Donnellan on behalf
19	of the defendant.
20	MS. FINDIKYAN: Kristina Findikyan on behalf
21	of the defendant.
22	MR. YUHAN: Stephen Yuhen, also on behalf of
23	the defendant.
24	MR. MOORE: Brian Moore from Dykema on behalf
25	of the defendant.

2.0

THE COURT: Okay. Welcome. You can all take a seat. We'll hear first from the defendants since this is your motion.

MR. DONNELLAN: Good morning, your Honor.

We're here today on Hearst's motion to stay discovery pending hearing and decision on its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and that motion, the motion to dismiss, is based on plaintiff's lack of standing to bring a claim under the Michigan VRPA.

The law in this area is quite clear. The burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction is entirely on plaintiff. That's the plaintiff's burden and plaintiff's burdens alone. From the very outset it goes back to the duty to investigate before the complaint is filed, and when there is a factual challenge to jurisdiction, plaintiff cannot rest on the pleadings, nor is he entitled to jurisdictional discovery unless he can first demonstrate through probative evidence that there is a factual basis for his claim of jurisdiction, and only then would jurisdictional discovery be warranted if there was some sort of a dispute between the two versions of facts that were provided.

Now the fundamental premise of this suit and the plaintiff's alleged injury giving him standing consistently from the start has been Mr. Grenke's alleged

2.0

subscription to Country Living Magazine, and Hearst's alleged disclosure of his personal reading information, specifically his name, address and the title of the magazine. That was the basis for the complaint where it's spelled out clearly that he was a Country Living subscriber. It was filed back in September of 2012, and the complaint contains more than 50 references to subscriber and subscription information. That was the basis for plaintiff's argument in opposition to Hearst's motion to dismiss the complaint under 12(b)(6) for lack of standing, and that was the basis for this Court's ruling on that motion accepting the allegations to be true, and finding them to be sufficient at that stage of lawsuit.

That was also the basis for plaintiff's discovery requests of the defendants, seeking documents and information about his subscriptions, and the contention he made in this initial disclosures where he stated that he possessed details about the subscriptions and subscription documents, specifically credit cards and bank statements, which contained charges associated with his subscriptions to Country Living and Good Housekeeping magazines.

We now know that that fundamental premise for the lawsuit is false. The documents don't exist. Plaintiff's counsel admitted that during the teleconference, which was a meet and confer before we filed the instant motions, and

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

they were not produced in response to our document requests, nor were they submitted in response to the present motion.

What plaintiff's discovery responses did confirm however, is that he was never a Country Living subscriber. All his claims and allegations and arguments over the years that he was a Country Living subscriber have been false. Having abandon his claim to be a Country Living subscriber, there is no probative evidence demonstrating that he has standing. The only evidence that he has put forward now where he claims to be evidence -- and we take issue with that -- is that he was a purchaser for somebody else in 2003. That doesn't meet his burden, but be that as it may, if that is his argument, that's fine. If that's his evidence, that's fine. We will respond on the motion to dismiss, and I think that we will be able to satisfy the Court that that does not create standing here, but for purposes of this motion, it's certainly raises no factual dispute with respect to the question of jurisdiction that would necessitate discovery on that issue.

Plaintiff is not entitled specifically to discovery about matters that are not alleged in the complaint, particularly about person who are not parties.

Mr. Scharg, during our meet and confer, was very

interested in probing whether or not nonparty Rose Grenke, the plaintiff's wife, might be a subscriber, and seeking out information about that, and seeking information about other possible basis for other claims or for other parties that might be substituted in into the suit or brought into the suit. That's entirely inappropriate under Rule 26, and under this circuit's very clear law that you may not take discovery in aid of bringing on new claims, and surviving a motion where you're allegations are clearly sufficient, and in this case they have essentially been conceited on a factual attack to be insufficient.

Now based on plaintiff's response and his position to date, I expect that he'll try to shift a lot of the burden and the blame that belongs entirely to his client back onto Hearst, and so I would like to reserve sufficient time to reply to those arguments, but at this point I would simply like to end by stressing that the plaintiff is the one with the burden here; that these facts were completely within his possession custody or control. He had an obligation to investigate at the outset, and had ample time to do so, and he has produced nothing. Discovery won't aid him now.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Scharg, first of all, are you abandoning the claim made in the complaint that your client was a

subscriber?

2.0

MR. SCHARG: No. It's funny that counsel brings up Rule 26.

THE COURT: Has your client been deposed?

MR. SCHARG: No. Before his deposition it was canceled by the defendant.

It's funny that they bring up Rule 26 though. On August 8, 2014, they served their Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures and said expressly that they have documents that -- they have relevant documents to the case, and those documents are plaintiff's subscription records. They have plaintiff's subscription records in their possession. What happened to them, and I would like to give the Court kind of a background of how we got to this point.

Counsel for Hearst has been playing games and acting in bad faith for the last four or five months. After requesting multiple extensions on discovery and stays, finally on May 19th, the discovery stay was lifted. At that time Hearst asked for an additional two months to respond to the interrogatories and request to produce. That brought their new deadline to July 23rd.

On July 21th, pursuant to the Court's order -
THE COURT: I'm sorry. What was the previous date?

MR. SCHARG: It was moved from May 19th to give an extension to July 23rd.

THE COURT: No. I mean, what stay order was in place?

MR. SCHARG: There was a stay that was entered in place while the parties went to mediation to try and resolve the claims.

THE COURT: All right. So that was by voluntary agreement?

MR. SCHARG: Yes. On July 21st, pursuant to the Court's order, we held a second 26(f) conference.

During that 26(f) conference, as we did during the first 26(f) conference in January of 2013, we talked about the claims and defenses again. As I understood it, Hearst's primary defense was that they gave notice to the plaintiff and therefore, they have an affirmative defense of notice.

Never once did they mention back in 2012, 2013 or 2014 that the plaintiff was not subscriber. To the contrary, everything that's happening to the case has suggested that he is a subscriber.

In Hearst's answer in affirmative defenses, they raise an affirmative defense of notice. It said we gave him notice, and therefore, the claim fits. They averred under Rule 11 that they gave the plaintiff notice. They also averred under Rule 11 that Mr. Grenke consented to

the disclosures at issue; that they obtained his written consent. Those are affirmative representations that were made.

Now in their papers, Hearst has gone after us a little bit saying, but we also said that he -- we denied the allegations that he is a subscriber, but that didn't mean anything in 2014 because his subscription lapsed by that point. When the complaint was filed, that subscription was true. When it was denied in 2014, there was no reason to ask a question, was he a subscriber, because his subscription lapsed and they raised these affirmative defenses that clearly showed you the subscriber.

Regardless after the 26(f) conference July 23rd, I received boilerplate blanket objections to every single interrogatory in request to produce. No documents, nothing. No relevant information. At that point for the first time they said, we're not going to produce until there is a protective order in place.

So the very next day on July 24th, I sent them a protective order. I sent them multiple emails, several telephone calls, all of which were ignored until August 29th when they finally sent me an email saying, okay. This protective order is okay. It was submitted to the Court and entered within a day.

2.0

So then the next question is so when are we going to get document information? I was promised they were going to be sent the next week. When they weren't, we held another meet and confer conference on September 11th.

THE COURT: Okay. I got a flavor of the history. Do you agree that if your client was not a subscriber, and that only subscription information was sold by the defendant or conveyed to third parties, that you would lack standing, and therefore, the Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction?

MR. SCHARG: No.

THE COURT: No? So even if he was never a subscriber, would still have standing?

MR. SCHARG: Well, the Michigan VRPA doesn't say anything about subscribers. It says any customer that purchases the written materials has standing.

Now we submitted a declaration --

THE COURT: Do you have any evidence that your client purchased?

MR. SCHARG: Yes.

THE COURT: What?

MR. SCHARG: We submitted a declaration saying that he sent Hearst a check with his name on it multiple times since 2003 when he's renewed the subscription every single year.

Now here's the big question, whose name is the subscription in? Mr. Grenke is in his mid-70's. He lives with his wife Rose. They've lived together for 25 years in the same place. There's no question here that one of them has standing to bring the claim, and they potentially have standing to bring the claim if they're both subscribers or both customers.

I mean, I would contend that a subscriber can be a customer, but a customer does not necessarily have to be a subscriber. Regardless, their information is being disclosed. They have already confirmed to at least 37 different companies, including Data Minors.

This is not the case where somebody is trying to lead the Court astray, and trying to pull the wool over the Court's eyes. One of them has standing, and it's absurd that if Mr. Grenke was not actually a subscriber, a customer of record, they would wait two and a half years to say something. I find that hard to believe.

The day before the 30(b)(6) deposition, it was canceled by the defendant in favor of just submitting these very limited declarations to the Court, and the fact that we're even talking about evidence and declarations, the binders full of documents and evidence on counsel's table, shows that there's an issue over the facts here, and the Sixth Circuit has said very clearly that when an

attack on subject matter implicates an element of the cause of action, then the district court should, quote, find that jurisdiction exists, and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits that the plaintiff claims under Rule 56.

The reason for that is clear. The Sixth Circuit explained that the rule exists to protect the plaintiff who's essentially it's facing a challenge to the validity of his claim.

Now if the defendants were able to challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the case, then there would never be a decision on the merits of the case.

It's -- this is an untimely attack, and the Sixth Circuit

I've cited --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, but an attack on subject matter jurisdiction is never untimely. It could be mounted well after a judgment is entered in the case. That's why we have to get it straight.

MR. SCHARG: That's true, and that's why I would like take discovery on this issue. I mean, this is an instance where whether Mr. Grenke has standing under the VRPA. All that evidence is with Hearst. They can very well challenge that his information was never not disclosed to any third parties. Okay. That's still a challenge to VRPA claim, which eventually goes to his

standing to bring the claim to federal court. 1 2 THE COURT: I got it. Thanks. 3 MR. SCHARG: Thank you very much. THE COURT: I'll give you a couple minutes. 4 5 MR. SCHARG: Can I make one last point? 6 THE COURT: Sure. 7 MR. SCHARG: To the extent that it was Rose 8 Grenke that's in their system instead of David, she's our client as well, and we will be happy to substitute her 9 10 into the case. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. I got that 12 impression. Okay. 13 So what do you know about Rose Grenke? 14 MR. DONNELLAN: Well, your Honor, with all 15 due respect it's completely irrelevant because --THE COURT: Well, it will be very quickly 16 17 relevant when he asks to amend the complaint. 18 MR. DONNELLAN: Well, your Honor, we cite 19 cases actually in our motion to dismiss on this point, 20 which is, if this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 21 because David Grenke does not have standing, the Court 22 does not have the power to substitute in another 23 plaintiff, and so that is something that I told Mr. Scharg

12-14221; DAVID GRENKE v. HEARST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

during our meet and confer before we filed this motion

when he specifically said that he wanted to -- he knew

24

25

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

this was a possibility, and he wanted to get it right, and he wanted to substitute her in if possible and start asking about information it.

This isn't the first time Mr. Scharg and his firm has sued Hearst magazines under a creative theory of a state law statute that's been untested, and in the previous case he lost, and I'm sure it won't be the last case. I have an obligation to my client not to open up ourselves to unnecessary and unwarranted discovery, which in this case he has not shown that his client is entitled to, and Rose Grenke as a nonparty is not entitled to discovery, and his lawyer is not entitled to take pre-suit discovery on behalf of that client who is not a party in this case, and the Court would be powerless to make that substitution unless he can satisfy you first that Mr. Grenke has standing here, something that we will establish that he cannot do, and something that the evidence that he has put in so far does not create any issue of fact with respect to the evidence that we put in. That's way the motion to stay should be --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt if I may. I'm sorry. I have a naturalization ceremony that I am suppose to get down to.

Assume that Mrs. Grenke is a subscriber, that Mr. Grenke wrote the check for the -- back in 2003, and

2.0

currently doesn't have checking records to support, but could credibly assert that he was the check writer during that period, and he wrote the check for the magazine.

Would that confer standing?

MR. DONNELLAN: Confer standing on whom?

THE COURT: Mr. Grenke as a purchaser.

MR. DONNELLAN: I don't believe it would, your Honor, because you still in order to have a violation, and plaintiff counsel has said this numerous times, and it's part of your Honor's order in this case, is that you have to have a disclosure, and the affidavit of Charlie Swift establishes that unless you are the subscriber or unless you are a gift donor, a formal -- purchasing a subscription as a gift for somebody else, your name will not be in the data base that might lead to disclosure.

The Swift declaration is unequivocal that

Mr. Grenke is not in there as a Country Living purchaser

or subscriber, and that his name was not disclosed, and

that is unrebutted testimony, and we'll address that again

in our reply in our motion to dismiss.

For purposes of this motion, he has raised no factual issue with respect to that testimony. That's why we say, even given whatever evidence he's put in, that's fine. We'll address that. We don't think that it suffice

2.0

us to establish standing. It certainly doesn't create any sort of dispute -- any genuine dispute as to jurisdictional fact warranting discovery.

If I could bring up a couple of other items, your Honor, counsel stood up, and he made the claim that Mr. Grenke wrote checks multiple times over a number of different years. That is not what Mr. Grenke said in his declaration. He said one time, 2003. That's specifically what he testifies to. If you look at the Declaration Paragraphs 5 and 6, there's virtually no factual content in that declaration, but he certainly didn't say that he wrote multiple checks over multiple years.

With respect to the Gentek case, again, we will address that in our reply on the substantive motion to dismiss. That is completely in opposite and inapplicable. That case and the other cases make clear that it only applies where there is federal question subject matter jurisdiction dealing with the federal statute. Otherwise there is no interest in the district court continuing onto bring about some sort of a definitive resolution of a state law question.

And finally, as to the process, I think your Honor got this point certainly very clearly in respect that this is an issue that has to be addressed whenever it is brought up, but also it's very important that there was a

2.0

process leading up to this motion, and that Hearst has met all of its obligations under this case. All of its pleading have been entirely accurate. He raises questions about an affirmative defense in the answer. In the answer though, it specifically, unequivocally denied that Mr. Grenke was the purchaser -- I'm sorry -- was the subscriber.

With respect to the coming to the point of filing this motion, that required plaintiff to clarify his own discovery requests so that we could conclude that a New York base purchaser from 15 years might not have been the plaintiff, and so that we can satisfy ourselves that he didn't have other evidence that he said in his Rule 26 disclosures that he had, and he still has not amended those Rule 26 disclosures.

We have amended ours to make perfectly clear that we were talking about Country Living subscription records generally based on the allegations in the complaint, but it wasn't until his interrogatory responses that we were in the position to file this motion your Honor, and that's when it was clear that he had been a Michigan resident for 30 years, and could respond that he was unclear. He didn't know if he was a subscriber during the meet and confer before this motion was filed when his counsel said that his client wasn't sure if he was a subscriber, and he

was not sure if he was a purchaser. So the declaration that he puts in now is in conflict with that statement that he made to us during the meet and confer call.

All of this, your Honor, I would submit is an inappropriate basis for a granting of discovery to conduct essentially a fishing expedition for what he says he wants to file a claim on behalf of another party, a nonparty, or to see if there is anything out there. He has not done anything to support his entitlement to that discovery, and we would respectfully ask your Court to grant our motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DONNELLAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: There are certainly significant challenges made to the plaintiff's standing to maintain his suit. However, the Court finds essentially that the plaintiff is entitled to test the assertion by the defendant that Mr. Grenke lacks standing under circumstances where he may be in a position to demonstrate that his wife and he affected a joint purchase, where the subscriber information basically is shared between them, and is ultimately demonstrated to be disclosed to third party.

I think basically the history of the case as recited by both counsel would conclude that the Court is unable to find that based upon the information adduced so

2.0

far, that Mr. Grenke has been demonstrated to lack standing altogether, and that plaintiff should have the opportunity to explore that limited issue.

So the Court is going to grant in part and deny in part defendant's motion to stay discovery, allowing discovery that goes directly to the question of standing, and I will stay all other discovery in the case.

I'm going to-- I'll put out a written decision on this point.

I just would like to observe, if I'm faced with a motion to amend by adding the wife to the case, and even if the defendant is entitled to a dismissal of the case, in all likelihood given the nature of the claims and the possible scenario as it relates to standing here, that dismissal would end up being without prejudice, and the amendment advanced by the defendant may well be permissible under those circumstances to cure the deficiency asserted by the defendant, but those are among many issues that would be considered by the Court at a later point.

Right now the Court will allow the plaintiff to test the sufficiency of the claims made in this motion in the motion to dismiss with discovery limited to that basic question, and we'll see where it goes from there.

MR. SCHARG: One housekeeping issue.

THE COURT: Yes.

2.0

MR. SCHARG: We have a discovery closure date of January 9th I believe.

THE COURT: Discovery closure date?

MR. SCHARG: Yes. I guess we can confer and submit to the Court a revised schedule if that works for the Court.

THE COURT: That's fine with me.

MR. SCHARG: Thank you.

MR. DONNELLAN: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DONNELLAN: Just with respect to the scope of discovery, I would ask that it be limited to Country Living Magazine because that is the only magazine that he was alleged to be a subscriber to in the complaint, and if there are any other details that the Court could provide us with in terms of the scope of discovery permitted, that would be helpful in order to avoid burdening the Court with any further questions about it.

The other thing is a scheduling matter, and I agree with my adversary. I think we can work out a schedule here, but we would like to put off obviously the time for us to reply on the motion to dismiss because I assume they are going to want put in some supplemental

response that we would reply to after the discovery is provided, and the witness who I think would probably be the most relevant witness here -- and I would ask that discovery be limited to his deposition -- Mr. Swift, to see it they can establish anything based on testing his declaration. He is going to be in Australia and will be unavailable for a period of time where I think the earliest that we can do that deposition would be in probably mid-January.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, with respect to that first question, why shouldn't it be limited to Country Living? That's the only thing that you've alleged, Mr. Scharg.

MR. SCHARG: In Mr. Grenke's declarations, he also indicated that he had a subscription to Good Housekeeping. I suggest it be limited to those two magazines. I think that's a fair compromise.

With respect to the Swift declaration, we've had no chance to understand who is in charge of what. All we've gotten was an untested declaration of a search of a very narrow limited data base.

Why don't I send them a 30(b)(6) deposition notice? We can talk about the topics, and perhaps

Mr. Swift is the person that would testify to all of it, but I'm not going to limit my discovery just to the search

2.0

of a very narrow data base within Hearst infrastructure. It is conceivable that there are several data bases that Mr. Grenke's information might be located in.

MR. DONNELLAN: Your Honor, respectfully
Mr. Swift's declaration is pretty clear on this. He's the
vice-president in charge of this entire area, and
testified to all of Hearst magazine records.

THE COURT: He will be available after --

MR. DONNELLAN: He will be available after the beginning of the year. Perhaps that would be the place to start restricted to Mr. Grenke's records to Country Living Magazine, and then if Mr. Scharg wants to seek additional discovery, then he can do so at that point, but to open ourselves up to a 30(b)(6), generally I think is unproductive. His last 30(b)(6) had 11 topics. He said in his response papers that he wanted to take that as a starting point and augment it with other topics. I just think that would be unproductive, and we would wind up in front of the Court quickly.

THE COURT: Sounds like Mr. -- what his name?

MR. DONNELLAN: Mr. Swift.

THE COURT: -- Mr. Swift has the position that would enable him to offer what needs to be offered on the question of standing.

2.0

MR. SCHARG: I agree on that. I just don't want to be limited to his actual statements in his declaration. That's all I'm saying.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. Anything that relates to standing.

MR. SCHARG: Thank you.

THE COURT: If the complaint does not refer to the second magazine, then I think you're limited to the first.

MR. SCHARG: That's fine.

MR. DONNELLAN: I'm sorry, your Honor. Final question. Will he be permitted to inquire as to Rose Grenke?

THE COURT: Yeah, I think so. As I said, I think one of the potential conclusions here is that they function jointly to purchase and subscribe, and that would also have some bearing on the Court whether the Court concludes that the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice. I would say that is -- you might as well find out what the facts are here that would determine standing, and I'm not convinced as of yet that there isn't a scenario that would allow Mr. Grenke to stay in the case.

MR. SCHARG: Thank you.

MR. DONNELLAN: Thank you, your Honor.

CERTIFICATION

I, Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, official court reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause on the date hereinbefore set forth.

I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

Ronald A. DiBartolomeo, CSR Official Court Reporter

Date

13 Official Court Reporte